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THE CENTRE STRIKES BACK: 
META-GOVERNANCE, DELEGATION AND THE CORE 
EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2010-2014 
 
$JURZLQJ OLWHUDWXUHRQµDJHQFLILFDWLRQ¶ µTXDQJRFUDWL]DWLRQ¶DQG WKHµDXWRQRPL]DWLRQ¶
RI WKH VWDWH KDV KLJKOLJKWHG WKH µFR-RUGLQDWLRQ GLOHPPD¶ in contemporary public 
governance ZKHUHE\ µKROORZHG-RXW¶RU µILOOed-LQ¶governments attempt to exert control 
over an increasingly complex state. In the run up to the 2010 General Election in the 
United Kingdom this coordination dilemma was prominent as the capacity of the Cabinet 
Office to exert control over DUP¶V-length bodies, either directly or indirectly, received 
intense criticism. This article presents the findings of the first detailed research project 
WRH[DPLQHWKHVXEVHTXHQW&RDOLWLRQ*RYHUQPHQW¶V approach to this dilemma. It argues 
that in relation to the governance of public bodies the role and capacity of the Cabinet 
Office has been transformed. In mapping this development the article explores the 
implications of the centre striking back in the context of µSRVW-NeZ3XEOLF0DQDJHPHQW¶
reforms. 
 
KEYWORDS: META-GOVERNANCE; CORE EXECUTIVE; DELEGATION; 
STEERING; CONTROL 
 
The structure of the state and the nature of contemporary public governance have changed 
significantly in recent decades. This is reflected in an extensive literature on (inter alia) 
µXQUDYHOLQJ¶, µXQEXQGOLQJ¶, µGH-FRXSOLQJ¶ µTXDQJRFUDWL]DWLRQ¶ DQG µDXWRQRPL]DWLRQ¶ ,Q
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Mark¶s terms the centrifugal pressures associated with New Public 
Management have VKLIWHG WKHQDWXUHRIPRGHUQJRYHUQDQFHIURPLWV WUDGLWLRQDO µOD\HUFDNH¶
PRGHO WR D PRUH FRPSOH[ µPDUEOH FDNH¶ FRQILJXUDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK WKH FRQWRXUV EHWZHHQ the 
public and private sector are increasingly blurred and organizational boundaries frequently 
overlap (2004). 7KLV VKLIW FDQ EH FKDUDFWHUL]HG DV D µKXE PRGHO¶ RI JRYHUQLQJ LQ ZKLFK D
VPDOOVWUDWHJLFGHSDUWPHQWDOFRUHH[LVWVDWWKHFHQWUHRUµKXE¶RIDYDVWUDQJHRIDUP¶V-length 
implementation mechanisms. Whilst often designed to create a leaner, streamlined or 
µVPDUWHU¶ VWDWH VXFK UHIRUPV KDYH, paradoxically, resulted in an increasingly complex, 
congested and fragmented public sector that exists beyond the direct control of elected 
SROLWLFLDQV)URPµVSHFLDORSHUDWLQJDJHQFLHV¶LQ&DQDGDWRµ&URZQHQWLWLHV¶LQ1HZ=HDODQG
DQG IURP µLQGHSHQGHQW DGPLQLVWUDWLYH DXWKRULWLHV¶ LQ )UDQFH WR µDXWRQRPRXV SXEOLF
RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ LQ7KDLODQG WKH VSKHUH RI µGHOHJDWHGJRYHUQDQFH¶ has grown significantly in 
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recent decades. Such trends pose significant questions about the future of the stateWKHµOLIH
DQGGHDWKRIGHPRFUDF\¶DQGWKHFKDOOHQJHVRISRO\FHQWULFJRYHUQDQFH, questions which have 
intensified in an era of global financial crisis ZKHUHQHZµK\EULGERGLHV¶DQGSXEOLF-private 
partnerships have further diversified the state in the quest for more efficient and effective 
governance.  
Since the mid-1990s this centrifugal dynamic has formed a central element of an influential 
QDUUDWLYHFRQFHUQLQJWKHµKROORZLQJ-out¶RIWKHstate; attempts by politicians and their senior 
officials to retain or regain their control capacity are therefore commonly couched in the 
ODQJXDJH RI µfilling-LQ¶ $ rich international literature IRFXVHG VFKRODUO\ DWWHQWLRQ RQ µWKH
KROORZ FURZQ¶ DQG µDGPLQLVWHULQJ WKH VXPPLW¶ DV SDUW RI D EURDGHU DFDGHPLF WXUQ WRZDUGV
what would be calleG µFRUHH[HFXWLYHVWXGLHV¶. It is against this background that this article 
returns to critiques of the British core executive and focuses on one specific element of that 
debate ± WKH FDSDFLW\ RI WKH &DELQHW 2IILFH WR RYHUVHH DQG FRQWURO DUP¶V-length bodies 
(specifically non-GHSDUWPHQWDOSXEOLFERGLHVRUµ1'3%V¶In so doing the article explores the 
implications of greater centralization and locates this topic within the contours of broader 
GHEDWHV FRQFHUQLQJ D µpost-New Public Management¶ paradigm with its central idea that 
governments around the world have attempted to reduce fragmentation and increase control 
oveU DUP¶V-length bodies through increased coordination and central capacity (Christensen 
2012). Drawing upon original research in the UK, this article makes three core arguments:  
A1. The role and capacity of the Cabinet Office vis-à-vis NDPBs has been significantly 
enhanced since May 2010. 
 
A2. 7KRVHSUREOHPVDQGFKDOOHQJHVWKDWKDYHWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµKROORZLQJ-
RXW¶KDYHQRZEHHQWUDQVIHUUHGWRPDLQVWUHDPGHSDUWPHQWVRIVWDWH 
 
A3. The Coalition GRYHUQPHQW¶VUHIRUPDJHQGD reveals a failure of meta-governance. 
In terms of rigor and originality this article presents the findings of the first detailed research 
project to analyze and track the Cabinet Office-OHG µ3XEOLF %RGLHV 5HIRUP $JHQGD¶ VLQFH
May 2010. It draws upon over 150 interviews with politicians, civil servants and chairs or 
chief executives of public bodies (conducted between September 2010 and December 2013). 
Documentary analysis and observation of internal meetings, workshops and conferences in 
ministerial departments also delivered fresh insights and data. This research was undertaken 
with the support of the Cabinet Office and the Public Chairs Forum and the findings were 
subjected to further analysis, review and reflection through engagement with select committee 
inquiries in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords.1 
                                                 
1
 Note withheld to ensure author anonymity. 
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In terms of significance and distinctiveness this article makes a theoretical contribution by 
locating core executive studies within the broader and related sub-fields of multi-level 
governance and meta-governance. It integrates these literatures to explore, in detail, the UK 
Government¶s response to the increased complexity and confusion widely seen to have arisen 
from New Public Management (NPM) reforms. Unlike previous work in this area which has 
tended to utilize quantitative analyses to explore the implications of NPM and post-NPM 
initiatives (Zafra-Gomes et al 2012), this article maps how central government capacity has 
been enhanced and traces the consequences of these changes for departments, public bodies 
and state governance more generally. In order to substantiate these arguments and explore 
their broader theoretical and comparative relevance this article is divided into three sections. 
The first section focuses on conceptual and theoretical foundations by exploring the concept 
of meta-governance before explaining its relationship with the literature on core executive 
VWXGLHV7KHVLPSOHDUJXPHQWLVWKDWZKDWPLJKWEHWHUPHGµWKHSROLWLFVRIWKHFRUHH[HFXWLYH¶
are, in fact, empirical manifestations of the broader socio-political challenges of meta-
governance (i.e. the two approaches are nested). The second and most substantive section 
then develops this argument by discussing how the Coalition Government in the UK have 
since May 2010 attempted to solve what Tam Gash and Gill Rutter (2011) labeled the 
µTXDQJR FRQXQGUXP¶ ZLWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI GHEDWHV FRQFHUQLQJ PHWD-governance and the 
capacity of the core executive. The final section then considers the relevance of this research 
from an international and comparative perspective.  
I. META-GOVERNANCE AND CORE EXECUTIVE STUDIES 
How do scholars who generally exist very much beyond the state seek to understand the 
shifting pressures and structures within the state? The answer is that they utilize a range of 
theories, concepts and techniques - tools of political analysis - in order to examine how the 
modern state actually operates intus, et in cute LHµXQGHUQHDWKDQGLQWKHIOHVK¶These tools 
include rational choice theoretic approaches, a variety of institutionalisms, sophisticated 
quantitative techniques, interpretive approaches and many other theories and methods. The 
selected tools deployed in this study are the WKHRU\RIµPHWD-JRYHUQDQFH¶DQGWKHFRQFHSWRI
µWKHFRUHH[HFXWLYH¶This section offers a brief account of each approach and illustrates their 
complementarity. It also highlights the relevance of each approach for the empirical focus of 
this article and reflects upon how the analysis of the Coalition GRYHUQPHQW¶V DSSURDFK WR
DUP¶V-length bodies might be used to develop or sharpen the analytical traction or leverage of 
each approach.  
,I WKH µKXE-PRGHO¶ RI JRYHUQDQFH GLVFXVVHG DERYH LV DFFHSWHG DV WKH GRPLQDQW HPHUJLQJ
model of the state, as many studies of developed and developing countries would suggest, 
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WKHQKRZSROLWLFLDQVJRYHUQ µDW DGLVWDQFH¶ LH LQGLUHFWO\EHFRPHs a ± if not the - central 
question of contemporary statecraft. Indeed, it is exactly this question that leads to the 
concept of meta-governance and its focus on µWKHJRYHUQDQFHRIJRYHUQDQFH¶RU ± to adopt 
6FRWW/DVK¶V(2002) terms ± WKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPµWKHORJLFRIVWUXFWXUHV¶WRµWKHORJLFRIIORZV¶ 
Scholars of meta-governance are therefore concerned with the changing role, capacity and 
reach of the state in an era of proliferating networks and increasingly de-centered structures. 
Meta-governance µSRLQWVWRWKHPHFKDQLVPVWKDWSXEOLFDXWKRULW\DQGRWKHUUHVRXUFHIXODFWRUV
can use to initiate and stimulate negotiated self-governance among relevant stakeholders 
aQGRUWRJXLGHWKHPLQDFHUWDLQGLUHFWLRQ¶ (Sørensen, Sehested, and Pederson 2011, p.379). 
7KHUHIRUH µOHDUQLQJ WR PHWD-JRYHUQ¶ -RQDWKDQ 'DYLHV DUJXHV µZRXOG DOORZ SROLWLFDO OHDGHUV
and state managers to harness and derive maximum potential from a world of QHWZRUNV¶ 
(Davies 2013, p.5). 7KLVHPSKDVLVRQµIORZV¶RUWKHFKDOOHQJHVRIJRYHUQLQJLQµDPHVV\DQG
IORDWLQJZRUOG¶raises questions about the relationship between hierarchies and networks and 
markets (Sorensen et al 2011, p.375).  
At this point a demarcation can be drawn between the µinteractive¶ RU µSOXULFHQWULF¶
governance school and its emphasis on meta-JRYHUQDQFHDVWKHµJRYHUQDQFHRIJRYHUQDQFH¶ 
DQG WKH µVWDWH-FHQWULF¶ RU µUHODWLRQDO¶ VFKRRO ZLWK LW HPSKDVLV RQ WKH µJRYHUQPHQW RI
JRYHUQDQFH¶ 7KH IRUPHU VFKRRO LV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK VFKRODUV LQFOXGLQJ -DFRE 7RUILQJ -DQ
Kooiman and Eva Sorensen and views meta-governance as a lens through which to explore 
how interdependent and semi-autonomous actors can be influenced by state authorities using 
non-traditional steering mechanisms. The latter school, by contrast, emphasizes the residual 
and continued role of the state within increasingly complex networks. For scholars, such as 
Gordon Macleod and Mark Goodwin (1999, p.716), meta-governance is part of an attempt to 
µIRUJH DQG VXVWDLQ D ³VXFFHVVIXO´ SROLWLFDO SURMHFW DQG VFDODU IL[¶. In this vein Dave Marsh 
(2011, p.44) conceives of meta-JRYHUQDQFH DV µFROOLEUDWLRQ¶ ± the selective or strategic 
adjustment of the mix of hierarchies, markets and networks by meta-governors. µ0HWD-
governance therefore not only indicates a continued role for the state in the regulation of self-
UHJXODWLQJQHWZRUNV¶3DXO)DZFHWWDUJXHVµEXWLWDOVRFDVWVGRXEWRQWKHYLHZWKDWWKHYHUWical 
hierarchies of the old social structures of the state have been replaced or subsumed by such 
QHWZRUNV¶ (2009, p.37). What both schools of meta-governance share is a focus on structuring 
WKHµUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶DQGWKHQVHHNLQJWRHQIRUFHWKRVHUXOHV through a mixture of control 
mechanisms or tools. For the interactive school attempts to meta-govern through traditional 
top-down processes need to be replaced with an emphasis on softer tools of governance, 
whereas relational or state-centric theorists, such as Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor, 
emphasize the continued role of hierarchical authority over semi-state and non-state actors.  
 5 
Such rich intellectual scaffolding arguably demands to be empirically tested through detailed 
accountV RI µPHWD-governors¶ LQ DFWLRQ $QG \HW IHZ VWXGLHV H[LVW WKDW H[DPLQH specific 
VWUDWHJLHVRIµFROOLEUDWLRQ¶ in the context of debates concerning the evisceration of the state. 
Even fewer have mapped how new governments have sought to re-define the relationships 
between hierarchies, markets and networks on taking power. It is for these reasons that this 
article¶V IRFXVRQ WKH µ3XEOLF%RGLHV5HIRUP$JHQGD¶ in the UK since May 2010 provides 
such empirical and theoretical potential. In order to realize this potential, however, it is 
necessary to adopt a complementary and more focused analytical toolkit, one with the 
capacity to engage with the significant issues that the concept of meta-governance highlights 
but with a tighter and more focused lens. The buckle in this article between the macro and the 
micro is usefully furnished in Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes¶ (2006 p.74) FRQFHUQ DERXW µD
hollowed-out state, a core executive fumbling to pull rubber levers of control, and a massive 
SUROLIHUDWLRQRIQHWZRUNV¶ and the connection this provides to a seam of scholarship on core 
executive studies. 
Reduced down to its simplest form the field of core executive studies focuses attention on the 
hub RUµWKHFRUH¶LQWKHµKXEPRGHO¶RIJRYHUQDQFH (discussed above). It is concerned with 
µWKH FHQWUH RI FHQWUDO JRYHUQPHQW¶ DQG ZLWK µDOO WKRVH RUJDQL]DWLRQV DQG VWUXFWXUHV WKDW
primarily serve to pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final 
arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government 
0PDFKLQH¶ (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990, p.4). It therefore seeks to examine, at a more 
detailed and fine-grained level, exactly how ministers and their officials seek to manage those 
competing and complex pressures illuminated by the theory of meta-governance. Three 
elements of this seam of scholarship make it a particularly appropriate for this DUWLFOH¶Vfocus 
RQWKHPDQDJHPHQWDQGFRQWURORIZKDWDUHYDULRXVO\WHUPHGµIULQJHERGLHV¶µSDUD-VWDWDOV¶RU
µK\EULGV¶ Firstly, core executive studies brings with it a certain institutional breadth in the 
sense that it directs attention to the interplay between state and semi-state actors (between hub 
and spokes). It also delivers (secondly) a degree of analytical depth due to its rejection of 
over-simplistic zero-sum conceptualizations of power and the cultivation of a more 
sophisticated approach to inter-organizational relationships that acknowledges the existence 
of complex resource-dependencies. Actors therefore possess different resources (money, 
personnel, legislative authority, electoral legitimacy, expertise, etc.) and power is therefore 
contingent and relational. This awareness of resource-dependency implicitly rejects overly-
simplistic principal-agent accounts and in its place offers a more complex account of 
bargaining and game-playing in which ministers, departments, regulators, quango-chiefs and 
all the actors ZLWKLQWKHGHOLYHU\ODQGVFDSHVHHNWRHQJDJHLQDIRUPRIPRGHUQµFRXUWSROLWLFV¶
in which competing claims and justifications are made, drawing upon established narratives, 
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traditions or institutional logics, in an attempt to either facilitate or block reform of one kind 
or another (Rhodes 2007, p.1248). 
If a focus on narratives and traditions brings us to what Oliver James (2009) ODEHOVWKHµWKLUG
ZDYH¶ RI FRUH H[HFXWLYH VWXGLHV E\ HPSKDVL]LQJ DQ LQWHUSUHWLYH RQWRORJ\ DQG EURDGO\
anthropological methodology then it also UHPLQGVXVWKDWWKHµILUVWZDYH¶RIZULWLQJIRFXVHG
RQµWKHKROORZLQJRXW¶RIWKHVWDWHDQGWKHµVHFRQGZDYH¶RQWKHµILOOLQJ-LQ¶RIWKHVWDWH Taken 
together these three stages have provided a sophisticated account of the day-to-day business 
of government and of the changing role of ministers. And yet the field is also open to 
criticism across three analytical levels. At the micro-political level there are actually very few 
studies that seek to map the changing topography of the core executive (in terms of resources 
and controls over semi-state institutions) over time. At the mid-range, studies have generally 
focused on either external pressures on the core executive (notably forms of Europeanization) 
or internal relationships within the Cabinet (i.e. the relationships between ministers, senior 
civil servants and special advisers, or between spending and coordinating departments). These 
DUHH[DFWO\WKHWZRµEURDGDYHQXHVRIUHVHDUFK¶LGHQWLILHGE\5REHUW(OJLH¶V synthesis of the 
field (2011, p.68). But no studies have attempted to examine how the core executive seeks to 
VWUXFWXUHDQGFRQWURO WKHUHODWLRQVKLSV WKDWGHOLYHU\GHSDUWPHQWVKDYHZLWK WKHDUP¶V-length 
ERGLHVWKH\VSRQVRU7KLVLVDFULWLFDOSRLQWWKDWWDNHVXVEDFNWRWKHQRWLRQRIµPDQDJLQJDWD 
GLVWDQFH¶ DQG WKH WKHRU\ RI PHWD-governance. As the bulk of public spending and public 
HPSOR\PHQWDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOUHVLGHVLQDUP¶V-length bodies then the capacity of the core 
executive to steer and control not just ministerial departments but also non-departmental 
organizational forms becomes central to the business of government (OECD 2002; Verhoest 
et al 2011).  
In the UK, for example, a large number of departments can now be characterized as hub-
model departments ± the Departments for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Business, 
Innovation and Skills; Culture, Media and Sport; Transport; Community and Local 
Government; Justice; Home Office, etc. - in which the vast majority of departmental budgets 
DUHDFWXDOO\FKDQQHOHGWRDQGVSHQWE\DUP¶V-length bodies. In some instances the size of the 
FRUH GHSDUWPHQW LV DFWXDOO\ GZDUIHG E\ WKH VL]H RI VSHFLILF µTXDQJRV¶7KH 'HSDUWPHQW IRU
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, for example, employs 2,457 staff (as of March 2013) 
whereas the Environment Agency (an NDPB sponsored by the department) employs nearly 
12,000 staff. Similarly, the new DUP¶V-length body charged with improving healthcare ± NHS 
England ± has a budget in excess of eighty billion pounds (around three quarters of the 
'HSDUWPHQW IRU +HDOWK¶V WRWDO DQQXDO VSHQG *LYHn this complex and dense bureaucratic 
landscape (and thirdly) the absence of any account in the existing literature that explicitly 
 7 
seeks to define or theorize core executive reform as elements of a larger meta-governance 
project is surprising. The simple argument being made is that meta-governance and core 
H[HFXWLYHVWXGLHVKDYHODUJHO\H[LVWHGDVµLVODQGVRIWKHRUL]LQJ¶ ± to adopt Hooghe and Marks 
(2003) phrase - that actually offer rich complementarities. Indeed, this synergy is made clear 
LQ+RRJKHDQG0DUN¶VLQIOXHQWLDOVFKRODUVKLSRQµXQUDYHOLQJWKHFHQWUDOVWDWH¶LQZKLFKWKH\
H[SORUH WKH µFR-RUGLQDWLRQ GLOHPPD¶ DQG challenges of steering increasingly complex 
networks. When viewed from this perspective the theory of meta-governance casts its net 
wide to try and capture the rules and process through which the totality of multi-level 
governance operates, whereas the field of core executive studies focuses more narrowly on 
the capacity of the core to control the periphery.  
The question then becomes one of understanding the changing relationship between core and 
periphery within an increasingly fluid socio-political context. The benefit of examining this 
question in the British case is that it arguably provides a rather extreme-case of governance 
failure. Even the most cursory analysis of British administrative history reveals that the 
FRQWURO DQG PDQDJHPHQW RI DUP¶s-length bodies has never been a priority for ministers or 
their departmental officials. The twentieth century ended with the House of Commons 
GHVFULELQJ 1HZ /DERXU¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH JRYHUQDQFH RI µTXDQJRV¶ DV µXQDPELWLRXV
piecemeal and ad hoc¶DQG3HWHU +HQQHVV\WHOOLQJWKH+RXVHRI/RUGVWKDWµZH>WKH8.@DUH
deeply ingrained as a back-of-the-envelope nation, certainly in the organization of the central 
VWDWH¶ (HC 209: para 59). Since the millennium a host of parliamentary reports (HC 537 
2010), official inquires (Cabinet Office 20022 National Audit Office 2004; 2010), think tank 
reports (IfG 2010), external management consultants (Veredus 2006), scholarly studies 
(Flinders 2009) and National Audit Office reports (2004; 2010) have all (in their own ways) 
highlighted five central issues (see Table 1, below).  
TABLE 1 Pathologies of Delegated Governance: Evidence up to May 2010 
 
Pathology Exemplar Reference 
1 
Insufficient clarity on the respective roles 
DQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVRIDUP¶V-length 
bodies and their sponsor departments. 
National Audit Office. 2004. µThe Corporate 
Governance of Sponsored Bodies¶ National 
Audit Office. 2010. µNon-Departmental 
Public Bodies Performance Reporting to 
Departments¶. 
2 
Insufficient mechanisms for maintaining 
productive institutional relationships 
EHWZHHQDUP¶V-length bodies and their 
sponsor departments. 
HC 537. 2010. µSmaller Government: 
Shrinking the Quango State¶. 
3 
Insufficient focus on developing the 
skills of those involved in operating 
DUP¶V-length government. 
Institute for Government. 2010. µRead 
Before Burning¶. 
4 
Insufficient capacity within the Cabinet 
Office to support sponsor departments 
House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution. 2004. µThe Regulatory State: 
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(or even maintain basic databases of 
ZKDWDUP¶V-length bodies even exist). 
Ensuring its Accountability¶; Veredus. 2006. 
µ9HUHGXV5LJKWIURPWKH6WDUW/HVVRQV
Learned from the Start-up of Non-
'HSDUWPHQWDO3XEOLF%RGLHV¶ 
5 
Insufficient focus on sponsorship by 
departments with official reports finding 
a large number of public bodies to have 
DVVXPHGµRUSKDQVWDWXV¶ 
Cabinet Office. 2002. µAlexander Report¶; 
HM Treasury. 2010. µ5HIRUPLQJ$UP¶V-
Length Bodies¶  
These issues combine to focus attention back on the notion of meta-governance and the 
capacity of the core executive to control and co-ordinate that vast sphere of agencies, boards 
and commissions to which powers and responsibilities are now delegated. The simple 
argument arising from all the reports and reviews ± irrespective of the source ± was that the 
core executive had lost control. The challenge for the next government in the run up to the 
2010 General Election in the UK was therefore to recalibrate the relationship between 
QHWZRUNVDQGKLHUDUFKLHVEHWZHHQµ7\SH,¶DQGµ7\SH,,¶ERGLHVRUVLPSO\EHWZHHQWKHFRUH
H[HFXWLYHPDLQVWUHDPGHOLYHU\GHSDUWPHQWVDQGWKHLUDUP¶V-length bodies. The manifestos of 
all three main political partLHVWKHUHIRUHLQFOXGHGDFRPPLWPHQWWRUHIRUPµWKHTXDQJRVWDWH¶
but with the benefit of hindsight one of the most instructive interventions in the cross-party 
DWWHPSWVWRµJHWWRXJKRQTXDQJRV¶FDPHLQ-XO\ZLWK'DYLG&DPHURQ¶VVSHHFKµ3HRSOH
Power: 5HIRUPLQJ4XDQJRV¶ZKLFKEDODQFHGDQHPSKDVLVRQabolition with an emphasis on 
reform. 
It would be far too simplistic for me to stand here and announce some kind of 'Bonfire of the 
Quangos'. People have heard that kind of talk many times before, and seen little to show for it. 
,QVWHDG ZH QHHG D PRUH VRSKLVWLFDWHG DSSURDFK« [P]roper public spending control means 
proper control of quango spending and proper control of quango spending has to start at the top 
(emphasis added).  
What the research presented in tKLV DUWLFOH UHYHDOV LV WKH PDQQHU LQ ZKLFK WKDW µPRUH
VRSKLVWLFDWHGDSSURDFK¶involved the selective and strategic recalibration of a number of tools 
of governance. This has led to a stark shift in the relationship not just between NDPBs and 
their parent departments but also in the role and capacity of the Cabinet Office which has 
been substantially strengthened since 2010. This shift is seen to echo the findings of µpost- 
NP0¶ theorists who diagnose an increase in central government capacity and departmental 
coordination as a response to the complexity caused by NPM reforms. By exploring the 
dynamics of change in the UK this article not only entwines two often separate literatures but 
also advances understanding of re-centralization initiatives and their implications.  
II. COALITION GOVERMMENT AND REFORM 
The Coalition GRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQWRaddress the governance failures outlined in the series 
of reports discussed above was signaled within days of taking office when the Minister for the 
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Cabinet Office, Francis Maude, announced a fundamental review of all public bodies (i.e. not 
just NDPBs) 7KH FRPSOHWH ODFN RI DQ\ UHOLDEOH FHQWUDO OLVWV RU UHJLVWHUV RI DUP¶V-length 
bodies ± irrespective of their specific organizational form ± made this a major undertaking. 
Although excluding some organizational categories (notably executive agencies and health 
bodies) the 2010 review provided the most comprehensive analysis of public bodies in the 
UK for several decades (Flinders and Skelcher 2011). It identified 679 NDPBs and 222 other 
statutory bodies (i.e. non-ministerial GHSDUWPHQWVSXEOLFFRUSRUDWLRQVDQGµIORDWLQJERGLHV¶
and its recommendations were far-reaching when compared against previous reform agendas. 
Whereas the Pliatzky Review of 1980 recommended a 12 per cent reduction in the number of 
NDPBs, the Maude Review targeted over a third of all bodies for abolition or amalgamation 
(more specifically 159 advisory NDPBs, 78 executive NDPBs, 6 tribunal bodies and 19 
µRWKHU¶ ERGLHV (HC 505). The fate of a further 40 ERGLHV UHPDLQHG µXQGHU FRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶ 
(Cabinet Office 2011). A Public Bodies Bill was brought forward as the main vehicle for 
implementing these measures and although the government was forced to make a number of 
concessions the Public Bodies Act 2011 received Royal Assent on the 14 December 2011. 
Twelve months later Public Bodies 2012 (re-published after a three-year gap) reported that 
more than 130 bodies had been abolished and more than 150 merged into fewer than 70 (an 
overall reduction of around 220). 
In pursuing this agenda the Cabinet Office vastly expanded its influence RYHU DUP¶s-length 
governance. The research on which this article is based identified five inter-related areas of 
increased control (see Table 2, below) that FKDUDFWHUL]HWKH&RDOLWLRQ*RYHUQPHQW¶VDWWHPSW
WRµPHWD-JRYHUQ¶DQGDOWHUWKHG\QDPLFVRIH[LVWLQJJRYHUQDQFH 
TABLE 2 The Public Bodies Reform Agenda: Core Executive Re-Collibration 
Dimension Meaning Evidence 
D1. Capacity  The ability to set out and enforce a 
meta-governance framework. 
Significant post-2010 increases in staff 
within the Cabinet Office (notably within 
the Public Bodies Team). 
D2. Control The power to dictate levels of 
discretion and autonomy across a 
number of issues. 
The Coalition Government introduced a 
new Controls Framework that shifts the 
balance of power back towards sponsor 
departments and the core executive.  
D3.Context The ability to stipulate the 
environment in which actors take 
decisions. 
A number of new requirements have since 
2010 emphasized transparency while also 
underlining the role of the Cabinet Office. 
D4. Connectivity The existence of an emphasis on the 
management of department-ALB 
relationships. 
The introduction of a range of reforms 
post-2010 that focus on the issue of 
sponsorship. 
D5. Continuity The existence of a rolling-
evaluation system to entrench 
specific reform principles. 
Triennial reviews, managed by the Cabinet 
Office, now ensure all NDPBs are subject 
to ongoing review and reform. 
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In terms of the first dimension (D1, Table 1, above) the capacity of the Cabinet Office was 
immediately strengthened in two ways after May 2010. First and foremost the size of the 
Public Bodies Team was increased from the 1.5 (full-time equivalent) staff it had enjoyed 
between 2006-2010 to 17 staff by the end of 2010. Furthermore the Public Bodies Team was 
bolstered by the creation of associated units such as the Commercial Models Team and the 
Shared Services Team that sit within the Transformation Cluster which is in itself part of the 
newly constituted Efficiency and Reform Group (nearly 900 staff) in the Cabinet Office 
(National Audit Office 2013). Secondly, capacity was strengthened in the form of a Minister 
of State who not only sat in the Cabinet but was also clearly and personally committed to the 
public bodies reform agenda. The post of Minister for the Cabinet Office is generally not 
viewed as a senior Government position (indeed, it is often associated with polite demotion) 
and ministerial tenure is therefore generally brief (from May 1997 to May 2010, for example, 
twelve individuals held this position with an average tenure of eleven months). Having a 
stable Minister of State who had a very clear grasp of the issues (and had even been the 
Shadow Cabinet Office Minister since 2 July 2007) was highlighted as essential to the success 
and pace of the subsequent reforms. As a senior Cabinet Office official noted,  
The impact of sustained ministerial focus cannot be over-stated. Even though the Public Bodies 
Reform has officially transferred to Nick Hurd [Minister for Civil Society in the Cabinet Office] 
Frances [Maude] still keeps a very close interest in the topic and will intervene if necessary. The 
stability matters for many reasons. Whereas the ministers in other departments may have 
changed Francis is able to µlock-in¶ the new minister due to his knowledge of all the previous 
QHJRWLDWLRQVDQGDJUHHPHQWV«LWV about political and institutional memory. Within the Cabinet 
Office his knowledge of what all the various policy teams are up to reduces fragmentation 
[Interview 3 Dec. 2013].  
Such capacities gave the Cabinet Office unprecedented ability to monitor and control the 
public bodies landscape as manifest in the range of new initiatives outlined below. 
At the heart of this reform agenda was a focus not on abolition but on increasing control (D2, 
Table 1, above) in the sense of increasing the capacity of the core executive to dictate levels 
of discretion and autonomy across a number of dimensions. This was delivered through the 
immediate implementation (from September 2010, without any prior consultation) of a new 
internal controls framework for all the NDPBs that were to continue in existence after the 
initial review. As Table 3 (below) illustrates this covered nine main areas of activity and was 
designed WRLQWURGXFHµtough spending controls to tackle unnecessary and poorly coordinated 
SXEOLFVSHQGLQJ¶ (Cabinet Office 2012). 
TABLE 3 Controls Framework Reforms 
Area Scope Control 
Advertising, 
Marketing and 
Communications 
Advertising and marketing, including digital 
activity; consultation activities; 
communication strategy; market research, 
Level 1 ± as set by departments 
Level 2 ± advertising, marketing or 
communications of £100k or above. 
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events and public relations activities. 
Strategic Supplier 
Management 
Expenditure and dealings with any strategic 
supplier. In particular, any new expenditure, 
contract negotiation or extension. 
Level 1 ± as set by departments 
Level 2 ± £5m for new expenditure; any 
contract extension or material changes to 
services valued at over £5m. 
Commercial Models All disposals of business; outsourcing 
contracts, the creation of any new 
organization regardless of its organizational 
form or notional value. 
Level 1 ± as set by departments 
Level 2 ± £5m for out-sourcing decisions 
otherwise no lower limit. 
ICT All ICT expenditure (contracts, licenses, 
pilots, etc.); common infrastructure solutions. 
Level 1 ± as set by departments 
Level 2 ± ICT Expenditure over £5m (full 
lifetime costs); £1m on back office reforms; 
£100K on common infrastructure solutions. 
Digital Default All departmental expenditure on digital 
services and activity. 
Level 1 ± as set by departments 
Level 2 ± all digital services (no lower limit. 
External 
Recruitment 
Any new permanent recruitment; any new 
direct temporary recruitment; indirect 
temporary (agency) staff; inward 
secondments or loans, extensions to existing 
recruitment. 
Level 1 ± as set by departments 
Level 2 ± Departments are required to submit 
quarterly recruitment forecasts. 
Consultancy Any central governmental consultancy 
expenditure over £20k. 
Level 1 ± all consultancy above £20k 
Level 2 ± all consultancy above £20k where 
contracts are expected to exceed nine months or 
contracts are expected to be extended beyond 
nine months.  
Redundancy and 
Compensation 
All redundancy schemes. Level 1 ± as set by departments 
Level 2 ± all schemes must be approved by the 
Cabinet Office. 
Property New leases or renewals; new property 
acquisitions; all facilities management contra 
contracts.  
Level 1 ± Rental expenditure under £100k 
during the life of the lease. 
Level 2 ± Rental expenditure above£100k 
during the life of the lease. Approval must be 
sought for all facilities management contracts 
regardless of value. 
Source. Cabinet Office (April 2013) Cabinet Office Controls Guidance.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cabinet-office-controls-guidance-version-3-1  
Notes  1. Level 1 ± Departmental authority and sign-off required. 
 2. Level 2 ± Cabinet Office authority and sign-off required. 
3. Exemptions will be considered but must be considered on a case-by-case basis by the Cabinet Office and H M 
Treasury  
 
The new controls framework (Table 3DERYH LVFULWLFDO WR WKHJHQHUDO µcentre strikes back¶
narrative offered by this article for at least three reasons. First and foremost, it reflects the 
increased basic capacity of the Cabinet Office to administer and oversee a multi-dimensional 
cross-governmental controls system when prior to the 2010 General Election it could not even 
PDLQWDLQDEDVLFOLVWRIZKDWDUP¶V-length bodies even existed. Second, it reflects an attempt 
by the Cabinet Office (as well as the Treasury) WRLPSRVHDµRQH-size-fits-DOO¶DSSURDFKRQto a 
highly diverse NDPB landscape where bodies differ in size, role, remit and governance. 
Third, although the new controls framework was originally announced in 2010 as a temporary 
PHDVXUH LW KDV QRZ EHHQ PDGH SHUPDQHQW µ7LJKW-WLJKW¶ DV RQH VHQLRU FLYLO VHUYDQW LQ WKH
Cabinet OfficH SXW LW µLV WKH QHZ SHUPDQHQW¶ UHVXOWLQJ DV RQH 1'3% &KDLU GHVFULEHG LQ
µPLFUR-management by remote control. It¶V ULGLFXORXV¶ 2FWREHU . Another senior 
official (May 2012) even described the imposition of the new controls framework as µWKH
tourniquet model RIJRYHUQDQFH¶(a point we will return to below). 
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If D2 emphasizes direct control and oversight then D3 (i.e. Context) emphasizes the Coalition 
GRYHUQPHQW¶V DWWHPSWV WR DSSO\ LQGLUHFW FRQWURO SUHVVXUHV WKURXJK DQ HPSKDVLV RQ
transparency (i.e. external control pressures). Details of how much officials are paid, every 
line of government spending above £25k, every contract worth over £10k (plus the actual 
contract in full) plus other measures, are all monitored by a new Public Sector Transparency 
%RDUG $W D EURDGHU OHYHO WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI µ:KROH RI *RYHUQPHQW $FFRXQWV¶ D
consolidated set of financial statements for around 1,500 organizations across the public 
sector, will provide new levels of transparency, delivering comparable accounts by which to 
assess government organizations (HM Treasury 2010) $GGLWLRQDOO\ DV SDUW RI WKH µ&OHDU
/LQHRI6LJKW $OLJQPHQW¶SURMHFW WKH H[SHQGLWXUHRI1'3%V LV QRZ LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWR WKH
Estimates and Resource Accounts of sponsoring departments which, in turn, ensures that 
Permanent Secretaries (as Accounting Officers) pay far more attention to the governance of 
public bodies (House of Commons Library 2010). Indeed, one element of this tighter 
relationship (between both the Cabinet Office and departments and between departments and 
their NDPBs) has been a sustained focus on connectivity (D4, Table 2, above). This basically 
relates to the nexus or interface between departments and their sponsored bodies where it is 
necessary to gain an effective balance between autonomy and control. Until the post-2010 
Coalition Government a focus on how public bodies were, let alone how they should be, 
sponsored had effectively formed a governance vacuum at the heart of British government. 
This was an issue that had been raised several times by the Public Administration Select 
Committee during 1997-2010 ZKRDUJXHGWKDWµThe Cabinet Office should revise its guidance 
on public bodies as quickly as possible, placing more emphasis on the proper, on-going 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ GHSDUWPHQWV DQG WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQV WKH\ VSRQVRU¶ - and which 
subsequently gained attention from the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition (HC 537 op 
cit. 2011. paras.71-72). As such one of the most innovative features of the Public Bodies 
Reform Agenda has involved not only a focus on taking sponsorship seriously in terms of 
skills and support (see Table 4, below) but also a more subtle attempt to re-position the 
importance of sponsorship within the culture of the senior civil service. µ7KHDLPKDVEHHQWR
not only improve the support and training given to those charged with managing 
UHODWLRQVKLSV¶ D VHQLRU VHUYDQW DFNQRZOHGJHG ,QWHUYLHZ 1RYHPEHU  µEXW PRUH
importantly to try and get these sorts of skills and experience recognized as crucial to the 
HIIHFWLYHEXVLQHVVRIJRYHUQPHQW¶ 
TABLE 4 Sponsorship Improvement Plan (Oct. 2013) 
1. Cross-Whitehall Sponsorship Network established (meeting monthly 
and led by the Ministry of Justice) to share examples of best practice 
and discuss principles of good sponsorship. 
2. Sponsorship Competency Framework developed for all civil servants 
working in a sponsorship role. 
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3. Sponsorship now recognized as a formal professional specialism within 
the Civil Service  
4. Cross-Government Sponsorship Champion appointed to raise 
awareness of the specialism, build partnerships between departments 
and public bodies and promote learning and development. 
5. Training units now hosted on the Civil Service Learning e-platform. 
6. Sponsors Induction Pack developed and all central guidance 
documentation revised and re-issued. 
7. Document sharing depository and message board established 
[www.collaborate.gsi.gov.uk] 
The final dimension (D5, Continuity) focuses on the legacy of the Public Bodies Reform 
Agenda and particularly on how a reform momentum based around (1) abolishing 
XQQHFHVVDU\ERGLHVUHWDLQLQJFRQWURODQGGHYHORSLQJQHZIRUPVRIµDOWHUQDWLYHVHUYLFH
GHOLYHU\ PHFKDQLVPV¶ FRXOG EH VXstained. The CRDOLWLRQ¶V DQVZHU WRRN WKH IRUP RI WKH
introduction of a new cross-governmental system of triennial reviews, once again overseen 
and regulated by the Cabinet Office. µThese triennial reviews will¶ WKH 0LQLVWHU IRU WKH
Cabinet Office told the House of &RPPRQVµHQVXUHWKDWQHYHUDJDLQZLOOWKHTXDQJRVWDWHEH
allowed to spiral out of control¶ (HC 108 2011). In a process that is very close to the previous 
system of quinquennial reviews - a system discontinued in 2006 ± departments are required to 
regularly FRQVLGHU µZKHWKHU D IXQFWLRQ LV UHTuired and, if it is, whether it should exist at 
DUP¶V-OHQJWKIURP*RYHUQPHQW¶ in order to advance further reform (Maude 2011).  
In the first year of the new triennial review process (2011-2012) a large number of relatively 
small and less politically salient NDPBs were selected for review with larger and more 
sensitive bodies such as the Environment Agency, Youth Justice Board and Research 
Councils reviewed in years 2 and 3. Whilst not fully rolled out ± with 280 NDPBs exempt 
from review prior to 2014-16 ± triennial reviews have prompted departments to pay closer 
attention to their public bodies and maintain an emphasis on reform. Although the vast 
majority have recommended the status quo rather than reform or abolition some changes have 
taken place. For example, WKH 2IILFH IRU 'LVDELOLW\ ,VVXHV NQRZQ DV µ(TXDOLW\ ¶ ZDV
recommended for abolition and the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority led to a change 
in organizational status from NDPB to executive agency. More widely triennials have made a 
range of recommendations designed to improve the governance arrangements (if not the 
efficiency) of public bodies. Accordingly, whilst triennials have been subject to a range of 
criticisms over capacity, proportionality and oversight (Dommett, 2014; NAO, 2014) they 
have provided a regular mechanism for review with the capacity to deliver future reform.  
What this brief focus on triennial reviews, and indeed this whole section, has highlighted is 
that a distinct shift in the governance of public bodies has taken place since May 2010- the 
centre has struck back. In Whitehall this shift is frequently spoken of in the language of a 
WUDQVLWLRQIURPDµORRVH-ORRVH¶UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKDUP¶V-length bodies LHD µSRRUSDUHQWLQJ¶
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model) WRD µWLJKW-WLJKW¶ UHODWLRQVKLS7KH WLJKWQHVVRI WKHQHZFRQWUROV IUDPHZRUN takes us 
back to the description by a senior official of this new relationship between Whitehall and its 
NDPBs as the application of µWKHWRXUQLTXHWPRGHO of governance¶. The fact that the official 
went on to warn of the risks of micromanagement and to recognize that µZHDOONQRZZKDW
happens if a tourniquet is too tight or is left on for too long ± WKHDUPGURSVRII¶provides a 
rather dramatic metaphor with which to reflect upon the broader implications of these 
changes and the comparative relevance of this research. 
III. LEARNING TO META-GOVERN? 
In many wayV WKH µTXDQJR FRQXQGUXP¶ SURYLGHV DQ DOPRVW SHUIHFW H[DPSOH RI $QWKRQ\
'RZQV¶ µLVVXH DWWHQWLRQ F\FOH¶ - governments around the world are elected on the basis of 
commitments to reduce µWKHTXDQJRVWDWH¶EXWRQFHLQRIILFHDUHJHQHUDOO\IDUOHVVLQWHUHVWHG
in implementing reform (Flinders et al 1999). Recent research in the UK, however, suggests 
that across several dimensions the Coalition GRYHUQPHQW KDV LQWURGXFHG µD PRUH
VRSKLVWLFDWHG¶ cf. Cameron) and significant reform agenda than might have been expected 
from previous historical experiences. Reforms have been implemented to address all of the 
pathologies identified in Table 1 (above) and although the long-term success or implications 
of these measures are yet to be seen they signal an attempt to bolster the capacity and role of 
the Cabinet Office. ,Q OLQH ZLWK µ$UJXPHQW ¶ DERYH after several decades of apparent 
decline it would appear that the centre has struck back (at least as far as the oversight of 
NDPBs). The aim of this section, however, is to drill-down further into this conclusion by 
employing the theory of meta-governance and the field of core executive studies to expose the 
broader empirical and comparative implications of this central conclusion. Further it 
examines the implications of this re-centralization and its relevance to the µpost-NPM¶
paradigm, arguing that concerns over central strategic capacity have not so much been 
µVROYHG¶ DV VKLIWHG DORQJ WKH FKDLQ RI GHOHJDWLRQ IURP WKH FRUH H[HFXtive to mainstream 
departments. This, as the work of MacCarthaigh (2011) suggests, has significant international 
and comparative relevance. Indeed, George Frederickson (2005, p.290) concluded his review 
of the international literature on public sector reform by suggesting that despite the pervasive 
influence of network discourses the underlying narrative of contemporary governance theory 
and practice is the search for order.  In the case of the governance of public bodies in the UK 
since May 2010 the Coalition Government has consistently emphasized a narrative of control 
but not necessarily order.  In terms of teasing out the theoretical and empirical relevance of 
this argument the issue of control leads us back very usefully to the field of core executive 
studies and the issue of order to the theory of meta-governance.  
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What is clear from the research presented in this article is that the capacity of the Cabinet 
Office vis-à-vis public bodies has been significantly strengthened, even transformed, by a 
Coalition Government which UHFRJQL]HG WKHSHULOV RI µDKROORZFURZQ¶ ,QFUHDVHG VWDIILQJ
ministerial stability and commitment and the introduction of robust control frameworks have 
LQFUHDVHGERWKWKHµUHDFK¶DQGµGHSWK¶RIWKHCabinet Office but this has, in turn, led to a new 
set of governing dilemmas. The first of these relates to the increasing role and demands of the 
Cabinet Office at a time when mainstream departments are facing significant budget 
reductions and subsequent staff cuts. In the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 
for example, budget reductions during 2010-2012 led to the loss of over 300 core 
departmental staff and the need to reduce core administrative costs and programme spend by 
£1,164 million (National Audit Office 2011, p.5; 2012, p.5). In many areas, as the Institute for 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V It Takes Two report of March 2012 makes clear, it is the staffing of 
departmental sponsorship teams that have often felt the brunt of these cutbacks. Such 
problems were compounded by the increase in staff mobility as a result of internal reforms 
DQGFULWLFLVPVUHJDUGLQJµVWDIIFKXUQ¶ZHUHFRPPRQDPRQJVW1'3%FKDLUV7KHFKDLUPDQRI
one large executive NDPB complained that in the twelve months after May 2012 he had met 
five different µVHQLRU VSRQVRUV¶ LQ KLV SDUHQW GHSDrtment, and in 2013 the Public 
Administration Committee highlighted reducing internal staff mobility as a key challenge for 
the future of the civil service). Departmental staff therefore complained that the capacity of 
the Cabinet Office to play a more strategic and proactive role in the governance of public 
bodies had increased at exactly the time that departmental capacities to manage their family 
RI DUP¶V-length bodies was waning due to the impact of expenditure reductions. The 
following quote is representative of a broader frustration.  
You do get a sense at the moment that you have quite a lot of resource in the centre, in both 
&DELQHW2IILFHDQG7UHDVXU\«[and] that more and more is done about ALB control, but [they 
are] unable to interface with any individual ALB themselves, and unable to interface with any 
LQGLYLGXDO VSRQVRU WHDPV«IURP ZKHUH ZH VLW WKHUH VHHPV WR EH D OHYHO RI SHRSOH DFURVV
Government roaming around in a very inefficient manner trying to impose [an] efficiency 
DJHQGDUDWKHU WKDQKDYLQJDVLQJOHSRLQWRIFRQWDFW IRU$/%VZKLFKMXVWVD\V³2YHUWKHQH[W
WKUHH\HDUVGR;ZLWK<DPRXQWRIPRQH\RUZH¶OOVKXW\RXLI \RXGRQ¶W´. 
Triennial reviews, in particular, were a specific point of concern as departments generally 
lacked resources with which to support and oversee these sometimes demanding reviews. As 
RQH FLYLO VHUYDQW FRPPHQWHG µZH DOO GR LW LQ RXU VSDUH WLPH DQG LW¶V YROXQWDU\ DORQJVLGH 
everything else, which, with hindsight, is a ridiculously stupid way of doing it if you wish to 
DFKLHYH UHDO VHULRXV UHIRUP¶ In many departments civil servants are struggling to identify 
UHVRXUFH OHDGLQJ WKHP WR HLWKHU FRQGXFW VXSHUILFLDO µWLFN ER[¶ UHviews designed to satisfy 
Cabinet Office requirements, or to delay reviews (indefinitely). Even departments which have 
devoted extensive resource such as Defra and the Natural England/Environment Agency 
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UHYLHZKDYHFRPPHQWHG WKDW µLWKDVQ¶W IHOWRYHU-resouUFHG\RXNQRZ ,IDQ\WKLQJ LW¶VEHHQ
TXLWH D VWUXJJOH WR FRYHU WKH JURXQG ZLWK WKH UHVRXUFHV¶. These different approaches may 
reflect different degrees of political impetus and prioritization within departments but for the 
majority of interviewees a lack of resources was the primary challenge.  
Just seeing the sheer level of people they [other departments] put into these things. It must be 
ORYHO\ KDYLQJ FKDOOHQJH JURXSV ZLWK ODZ\HUV VHQLRU SHRSOH RQ WKHP , FDQ¶W LPDJLQH HYHU
getting a group like WKDWWRFRPHWRJHWKHU,¶GORYHWREHDEOHWRDQGREYLRXVO\WKDW¶VZKDW,¶OO
WU\DQGGRIRURXUQH[WRQHVEXWKDYLQJWKDWNLQGRIGHGLFDWHGUHVRXUFHWKH\¶UHOXFN\WKey can 
GRWKDW¶. 
Instead of identifying processes of either µILOOLQJ-LQ¶or µKROORZLQJ-RXW¶± a binary focus that 
tends to dominate the existing literature ± a distinctive element of this research in the UK is 
its identification of a simultaneous process RIµILOOLQJ-LQ¶WKH&DELQHW2IILFHDQGµKROORZLQJ-
RXW¶GHSDUWPHQWV7KHSUREOHPRIWKHµKROORZFURZQ¶KDVWKHUHIRUHEHHQQRWVRPXFKVROYHG
as passed-on down the chain of delegation. This process of administrative transference has 
been complicated by concerns about the proportionality of new processes. In particular the 
new controls framework (Table 3, above) as the data and information requests it entailed were 
viewed as detrimental to allowing bodies to focus on their core tasks. Many of the Cabinet 
2IILFH¶V GDWD UHTXHVWV ZHUH reported by officials to be µIUDQNO\ FRPSOHWHO\ QRQVHQViFDO¶, a 
problem compounded by the perception of disunity conveyed in the comment that µWKHUHDUH
you know, 15 different bits [of the Cabinet Office] that are always fighting each other all the 
WLPH¶  
The impact on our scarce resources of dealing with big GHSDUWPHQWVWKDWFDQ¶WMRLQWKHPVHOYHV
XS7KHDPRXQWRIGDWDUHTXHVWVZH¶YHKDGWRGRSURYLGLQJWKHVDPHLQIRUPDWLRQRQVOLJKWO\
GLIIHUHQW VSUHDGVKHHWV EHFDXVHRQHSDUWRI WKH FHQWUH LVQ¶W SUHSDUHG WRXVH DQRWKHUSDUW RI WKH
FHQWUH¶VVSUHDGVKHHWDQGwants it in a slightly different format!  
NDPB staff expressed similar concerns with repeated complaints about the constant need to 
µIHHGWKHPDFKLQH¶µWhy have all that [delegation] and have this heavy hand of µBig Brother¶ 
parent department also trying to govern us?¶ D VHQLRU 1'3% RIILFLDO DVNHG $Q 1'3%
Chairman similarly noted,  
It just doesn't make sense and it's wasting an awful lot of precious civil service time which they 
really ought to spend on their day jobs. Just give us an envelope of money. Tell us how many 
people we can employ. Tell us what we're accountable for and what we've got to deliver at the 
end of the year and let us get on with it. If we don't deliver it, sack us. It's that easy!  
These findings are supported by the ,QVWLWXWHIRU*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHSRUWIt Takes Two of March 
WKDWVLPLODUO\KLJKOLJKWHGWKDWµdata requests and new controls from the centre since the 
DGYHQWRIWKH&RDOLWLRQKDYHEHFRPHDPDMRUVRXUFHRILUULWDWLRQ¶ (Rutter et al 2012, p.8). In 
WKHORQJUXQWKHUHSRUWFRQFOXGHGDµGHWDLOHGPLFUR-control regime risks a failure to take full 
DGYDQWDJHRI WKHSRWHQWLDOEHQHILWVRIDUP¶V-OHQJWKJRYHUQDQFH¶ (Ibid., p.52). Such findings 
reveal that tightened central control and limited agency autonomy do not necessarily deliver 
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the form of efficiency and accountability gains often presumed from such reforms (see 
Christensen and Laegreid 2007; Dubnick, 2014). This finding forces us to step-back from a 
focus on the core executive and to examine the CRDOLWLRQ¶V Public Bodies Reform Agenda 
from the standpoint of meta-JRYHUQDQFH :KDW¶V SDUWLFXODUO\ LQWHUHVWLQJ DERXW WKLV
perspective is that it is one that is explicitly recognized by Cabinet Office officials.  
Meta-governance is basically what we do. I wDV DW PHHWLQJ \HVWHUGD\ WKHPHG DURXQG µPHWD-
SROLF\¶DQGZKHWKHU\RXFDOOLWµWKHSROLF\IRUSROLF\-PDNLQJ¶RUµWKHJRYHUQDQFHRIJRYHUQDQFH¶
RUµWKHVWUDWHJ\IRUVWUDWHJ\¶ZHDUHEDVLFDOO\doing meta-JRYHUQDQFHLQVRPHZD\«:HFUHDWH
the conditions that make it easier for departments to govern. That might be signing-up the 
ministers, providing the guidance or facilitating a different mix of service providers. But we are 
EDVLFDOO\µKDQGVRII¶± RQO\VRPHWLPHVµKDQGVRQ¶ 
What the research presented in this article provides is a case study in meta-governance that 
FOHDUO\UHVRQDWHVZLWKWKHµVWDWH-FHQWULF¶RUµUHODWLRQDO¶VFKRRORIPHWD-governance (discussed 
above) DVDQHZJRYHUQPHQWKDVXQGHUWDNHQDSURFHVVRIZKDWFRXOGEHWHUPHGµFROOLEUDWLRQ¶
or the selective/ strategic adjustment that supports the arguments of scholars including Dave 
Marsh and Paul Fawcett that the vertical hierarchies of the state have not been subsumed or 
replaced by complex networks. 7KHµUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶KDYHFOHDUO\FKDQJHGDQGQHw tools of 
governance have been constructed.  ,I DQ\WKLQJ WKH µVKDGRZ RI hierarchy¶ ± to paraphrase 
Fritz Sharpf ± has grown significantly darker for NDPBs in the UK and this was captured in 
the description provided by one NDPB chair that his relationship with his sponsor department 
had µJRQHIURPDQDUP¶V-length relationship to more like an arm-ORFN¶.  
$V DOUHDG\ PHQWLRQHG WKLV SURFHVV RI UHIRUP FDQ EH ORFDWHG ZLWKLQ µSRVW-130¶ QDUUDWLYHV
drawn from a number of countries that emphasize centripetally oriented governance 
modifications forged around strengthened hierarchical control (see, for example, Dent, 2005; 
Kinder, 2012). And yet the twist, hook or barb in the results of this research is that once again 
simplistic and zero-VXP DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW µSUH¶ µFXUUHQW¶ RU µSRVW-130¶ VWDJHV RI VWDWH
GHYHORSPHQW IDOWHU DJDLQVW WKH µPDG HPSLULFLVP¶ DQG µEDURTXH FRQIXVLRQ¶ WKDW &KULVWRSKHU
Hood and Andrew Dunsire (1978) identified in the British context nearly forty years ago.  
Put slightly differently, what this research has revealed is that whilst the Coalition 
Government has emphasized control it has underplayed order in pursuing its reforms. Despite 
the call from numerous official reports, parliamentary committees, think tanks and academics 
around the 2010 General Election for a future government to rationalize the complexity of the 
administrative landscape beyond ministerial departments (of which NDPBs form just one 
layer) the government rejected calls to undertake a more fundamental re-structuring of the 
DUP¶V-length body landscape. Hence calls from academics such as Matthew Flinders and 
independent bodies such as the Institute for Government were ignored. In explaining this 
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decision the Minister for the Cabinet Office, Frances Maude, rejected demands to rationalize 
the complete institutional landscape E\ H[SODLQLQJ µ,¶P NLQG RI WHPSHUDPHQWDOO\ VOLJKWO\
allergic to trying to create a top-down overall scheme of arrangement. It is very complex and 
confusing, and simplification is desirable but I think not in order to meet the demands of 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHWLGLQHVV¶+&4)URPERWKDFRPSDUDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHDQGIURPWKH
position of theories of meta-governance the British case is therefore distinctive due to the 
CRDOLWLRQ¶Vattempt to manage complexity in one bureaucratic sphere (i.e. NDPBs) through 
increased control while at exactly the same time creating an ever more complex patchwork of 
DUP¶V-length bodies (in the form of ever more creative hybrid bodies, mutualisations, public-
private partnerships, etc.) that exist beyond this tighter, more explicit and more formalized 
controls system. 7KHUHIRUH DOWKRXJK WKH FHQWUH PD\ ZHOO KDYH µVWUXFN EDFN¶ LQ UHODWLRQ WR
NDPBs serious questions still remain about the CRDOLWLRQ¶V broader approach to meta-
governance.  
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